Analysis of a sample of 253 joint venture announcements suggests that joint ventures tend to be announced when the parent firms' performance is deteriorating. However, the parent firms earn positive abnormal returns around the announcement date. There is considerable cross-sectional variation in the stock market reaction to joint venture announcements. We identify three drivers of stock market reactionstrategic considerations, managerial misalignment, and signaling. The stock market reacts positively to joint ventures that involve pooling of complementary resources. Joint ventures that are carried out by firms with high levels of free cash flow are received negatively, indicating that the stock market penalizes joint ventures that are susceptible to managerial misalignment. Small firms that enter into joint ventures with larger firms earn significant positive abnormal returns, because the joint ventures acts signals of the small firm's value. 1 We are grateful to
INTRODUCTION
This paper looks at two issues. First, are joint ventures announced when firms are performing well or badly? Second, which joint ventures create value and which destroy value? In doing so, we go beyond prior research, which has focused on asking whether joint ventures create value in aggregate.
In order to conduct this study, we construct a data set of 253 joint venture announcements from 1986 to 1993. Unlike prior research, we focus on joint venture announcements rather than joint venture signings.
We take stock market reaction to the parent firms upon their announcing the joint venture to be the measure of value creation. Direct measures, such as market valuation of the joint venture or joint venture performance data, are not available, since joint ventures are legally reported as subsidiaries of their parent firms. It has also become increasingly clear that the traditional approach of equating longevity with value creation is flawed: successful joint ventures may be terminated early once their objectives are met, and conversely, unsuccessful joint ventures may persist for a long period of time (Gomes-Casseres, 1987; Nanda and Williamson, 1995) . Researchers (e.g. McConnell and Nantell, 1985; Koh and Venkatraman, 1991 ; hereafter referred to as M-N and K-V respectively) have treated stock market reaction to joint venture announcement as a forward-looking measure of value creation by joint venturing. This approach has also been employed with considerable success in the related field of mergers & acquisitions. (Refer Jensen and Ruback, 1983 and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988 for a survey of the vast literature in this area.) Research in the mergers and acquisitions literature has found evidence that ex-ante expected performance, as measured by stock market reaction, is positively related to ex-post realized performance (Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, 1992; K-V, 1991; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992) .
We find that joint ventures tend to be announced in times of deteriorating performance, when the parent firms are underperforming the stock market and their accounting performance is declining as well.
The stock market reacts to joint venture announcements with significant positive abnormal returns.
There is wide dispersion of excess returns, influenced by three drivers: strategic considerations, signaling information, and managerial misalignment. The strategic driver refers to strategic considerations that underlie the formation of joint ventures. Increased market power or access to complementary capabilities can create value. The signaling driver refers to information about the parent firms that the joint venture conveys to the stock market. A joint venture between a large and a small firm may validate the worth of the small firm. Managerial misalignment refers to joint ventures that are driven by managerial motives misaligned with shareholders' interests.
All three drivers significantly influence the abnormal returns that firms receive upon announcing joint ventures. There is a non-linear relationship between abnormal returns and the "distance" between the parent firms' industries. Firms that are neither too close nor too distant from each other receive the highest abnormal returns, whereas firms that are very close or very distant from each other get lower abnormal returns. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the stock market values complementarity between the parent firms and inconsistent with the hypothesis that the stock market values joint ventures that increase market power.
There is a negative association between the level of free cash flow and the stock market reaction to joint venture announcements. Firms with high levels of free cash flow may be entering joint ventures because managers choose to use free cash flow in non value maximizing investments like joint ventures rather than disbursing it to shareholders. Such joint ventures are viewed negatively by the stock market.
The stock market reacts positively to small firms entering into joint ventures with larger partners.
The joint venture announcement acts as a signal to the stock market of the smaller firm's value.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses prior research on the circumstances in which joint ventures are announced and the factors that can lead joint ventures to create or destroy economic value. Section 3 details how we arrive at our data set of joint venture announcements, describes the data set we have collected, and delineates the methodology used to derive stock market reaction to the announcements. Section 4 reports the performance of the parent companies in the time leading up to the joint venture announcement in order to understand the circumstances during which joint ventures tend to be announced. Section 5 describes the aggregate results of the event study. Section 6 discusses the findings of the cross sectional analysis to understand how the stock market's reaction varies across different joint venture announcements. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of our results.
THEORY

When do firms enter into joint ventures?
Firms that are performing well may enter into joint ventures because their opportunities exceed their capacity to exploit all of them alone. Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993 (hereafter refered to as B-K), report that joint ventures occur when firms are performing well with respect to market expectations.
However, it is also likely that underperforming firms use joint ventures as mechanisms to improve performance. For instance, Nanda and Williamson, 1995, point to several cases of firms that entered into joint ventures when their divisions were underperforming. It is an empirical matter as to which of these forces is predominant. In section 4, we address this issue by looking at the performance of firms entering into joint ventures in the period before the joint venture announcement.
Value creation through joint venturing
We categorize the factors influencing stock market reaction to joint venture announcements into three main 'drivers': strategic reasons, managerial misalignment, and signaling.
Strategic driver: Firms could enter joint ventures for two main strategic reasons: market power and complementarity. Researchers have argued that entering joint ventures allow the partners to shape competition by increasing their market power (Bresnahan and Salop, 1986; Reynolds and Snapp, 1986; Kwoka, 1992) . Other researchers have stressed that joint ventures help firms access complementary assets in circumstances of market-failure (Hennart, 1988; B-K, 1993; Nanda and Williamson, 1995b) .
If the stock market believes that market power is the main driver of value in a joint venture, we expect to see an inverse relation between stock market reaction and the "strategic distance" between the partners. The closer the parent firms are, the more effectively would pooling of operations help them exert market power in the product-market space they occupy.
If the stock market believes complementarity to be the main value driver, we expect to see an inverted-U relationship between partner distance and stock market reaction to the joint venture announcement. Firms that are very close simply duplicate their assets, whereas firms that are very far are too dissimilar to have complementary resources. Firms whose distance from each other is close enough to ensure complementarity but not so close as to cause duplication are likely to get the most positive reaction.
The distance measure we use to proxy for the strategic distance between the parent firms is as follows. If the parent firms have the same 4 digit SIC code, we assign them a distance of 0. If they have the same 3 digit SIC code but different 4 digit codes, we assign them a distance equal to the absolute value of the difference of their fourth digit. To illustrate, the difference between 3678 and 3672 is 6. If they have the same 2 digit code but different 3 digit codes, we assign them a distance equal to the absolute value of the difference of their third digit times 10. Thus, the difference between 3678 and 3691 is 20 (i.e. the difference between 367x and 369y is 20 as x and y are irrelevant for the distance across 3 digit SIC codes).
If they have the same 1 digit code but different 2 digit codes, they are assigned a distance of the difference of their second digit times 100. Thus, the difference between 3678 and 3317 is 300 (the last two digits being irrelevant for a comparison at the 2 digit SIC code level). If their 1 digit codes are different, they are assigned a distance of 1000. The reason for this is that while there is some ordering at the two digit level, the ordering of the 1 digit groups is arbitrary. It is difficult to argue that SIC 1000s are closer to SIC 2000s than they are to SIC 3000s. Hence we choose a uniform maximum number of 1000. The distance figure is then normalized through division by 1000, so as to lie between 0 and 1.
Although we recognize the limitations of the SIC code technique in accurately reflecting distances, we believe our approach has two main strengths. First, it allows us to use an objective, rather than a subjective, measure. Second, the distance measure recognizes that commonality at one SIC level implies an order of magnitude greater closeness than commonality at the next SIC level. Our measure takes advantage of the ordering within broad SIC classes while avoiding the pitfall of naïve distance estimation that simply takes the absolute value of the difference in SIC codes as the measure of distance. If the stock market can identify joint venture announcements that arise from managerial misalignment, we would expect it to respond by lowering its valuation for the parties announcing the joint ventures. Since the extent of free cash flow in a firm is a measure of the degree of managerial 'slack' in the firm, we expect a negative relation between a firm's free cash flow level and the stock market reaction to its announcing a joint venture.
We use the excess cash measure developed by Barth and Kasznik (1996) to estimate a firm's free cash flow. Free cash flow is defined as (cash from operations + cash from investments -cash from financing) deflated by total assets.
Signaling driver: Apart from its intrinsic merits, a joint venture may also convey news to the stock market about the partners themselves. The sheer fact that a small firm is able to attract the attention of a large partner into a joint venture could lead to an upward revision in the stock market's valuation of the small firm. We use market ratio (the relative market capitalization of the partner firm to that of the firm) as a measure of the strength of the signal about the parent firm's quality that the joint venture conveys to the stock market.
Apart from these three drivers, joint ventures might have differential value across different industries, based on the specific structure and conduct of those industries. Although M-N suggest that abnormal stock returns do not vary systematically across industries, other researchers have argued for industry specific differences. The biotechnology industry, for example, is characterized by dense networks of interrelations and success in the industry requires establishing such alliances (Barley, Freeman, and Hybels, 1992; Powell and Brantley, 1992) . Conversely, research has found joint ventures in oil exploration to be value diminishing (Kent, 1991) . 3 We control for industry variations by constructing industry dummies.
DATA
In this section, we identify our sample of joint venture announcements and describe the methodology used to derive excess returns to these announcements.
Data Set
We start with the joint venture announcements recorded by Securities Data Corporation (SDC) over the period from 1984 to 1994. SDC has a data set of alliances including joint ventures, marketing arrangements, and licensing agreements. We define a joint venture as the creation of new legal entity in which the parent firms have equity stakes. This excludes arrangements such as marketing or licensing agreements. From the chronological spread of the data, it is obvious that the SDC records are not exhaustive. SDC has been capturing a larger fraction of the universe of all joint venture announcements in recent years than in earlier years, and there is also a lag between the occurrence of an announcement and SDC's record.
Our tests were also repeated using a simple method of assigning distance=0 for identical 4 digit SIC codes, distance=1 for same 3, but not 4 digit SIC codes, distance=2 for same 2, but not 3 digit SIC code, distance=3 for same 1 digit , but not 2 digit SIC code and diatcne=4 for totally unrelated SIC codes. The results are materially similar and not reported.
We focus on joint ventures announced during the time period from 1986 to 1993 that involve only two partners, 4 both of which are U.S. corporations. We exclude joint ventures in unclassified industries (SIC codes 9000). We further narrow the data set to the 568 cases that pertain to joint ventures in which at least one of the partners is a publicly quoted company or subsidiary of a publicly quoted firm. In all these instances, we scan newswire reports to identify the first date when the joint venture was announced.
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) market value and returns data around the joint venture announcement date are available for 888 parent companies. Market value and returns data are available for both parents in 263 instances. The data set is distributed over a wide range of industries: 46 2-digit SIC codes are represented, with the 6 largest industries (chemicals, computer equipment, communications, electric services, oil and gas extraction, and electrical equipment) constituting 55% of the sample. 5 There are some interesting trends in joint venture formation: most parent firms in computer equipment industry use joint ventures to diversify out, and several non-service industry firms enter joint ventures classified as business services.
The 888 cases correspond to 468 parent firms, 162 of which appear more than once as joint venture partners. 6 The 6 companies that appear most frequently in joint ventures are IBM (31 occurrences), du Pont (17), General Electric (15), Dow Chemical (13), General Motors (12), and Time
Warner (10). The market values of the parent companies range from $2 million to $89 billion. The mean market value of a parent company is $9.2 billion and the median market value is $2.8 billion. 7 The high median indicates that firms entering into joint ventures are large firms. The difference between the mean and median indicates that there are several firms with very high market value.
Event study approach
We use CRSP beta excess returns for the 730 firms for which they are available. The remaining firms are listed on NASDAQ. We are able to generate abnormal returns for 67 of these firms following the portfolio approach used by Fama and French (1992) . We construct portfolios of firms, matched in size and risk, in order to generate excess returns. For each year, all public firms are classified into size deciles, and each size decile is divided into risk deciles based on their betas, using lagged annual returns. The excess return for each firm equals the return of that particular firm minus the mean return for its size and risk portfolio.
We conduct two event studies: (1) a long window study of monthly excess returns from 12 months before to 12 months after the joint venture announcement to observe long term trends in the stock market 6 The 263 joint ventures involve 253 parent companies, 60 of which appear more than once as joint venture partners.
IBM appears as a partner in four of the ten largest joint ventures (in terms of combined parent firm size), General Electric appears in three.
performance of the parent firms around joint venture announcements, and (2) a short window study of daily excess returns from 45 days before the joint venture announcement to 45 days after to observe stock market reaction to joint venture announcements.
To estimate stock market reactions at joint venture announcements, we compute daily excess returns over the event window of -45 to +45 days and then cumulate these excess returns for the periods -45 to -11, -10 to -2, -1 to +1 (the event itself), +2 to +10, and +11 to +45 for each corporation involved in the joint venture. for all firms that belong to in the same 4 digit SIC code in that year. 9 We do not allow firms to repeat in the panel within a 3 year period. If repetitions are allowed, the downward drift in returns gets even more accentuated. By month 0, the cumulative abnormal return is -9.8%; by month +12, it is -16.3%.
Joint ventures are akin to partial mergers, and our finding resonates with the findings of merger studies as summarized by Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 168-170) . They report that stock returns for target firms tend to drift downward relative to the stock market over a period between two years and six months before merger announcement while the stock returns for acquiring firms do not change in a systematic manner.
Our result is at variance with B-K's findings (1993, 
EVENT STUDY RESULTS
In this section, we report the results of the event study. We report abnormal returns at firm level and joint venture level, and then address whether economic value is created in aggregate.
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Kothari and Warner (1997) point out that long window event study results should be interpreted with caution. They argue that persistent drift in cumulative abnormal returns can occur both in the same direction as the announcement effect as well as in the opposite direction in long-window event studies of securities, because the market model does not adequately control for size and book-to-market effects (Fama and French, 1993) . In order to ensure that the negative drift we observe is driven by economic reasons rather than because of weaknesses in the model used by CRSP to estimate abnormal returns, we also conduct the long window test by calculating abnormal returns by the portfolio approach discussed in Section 3.2 above. The downward drift persists, although it is attenuated. Cumulative abnormal returns are -4.50% by month 0 and -6.47% by month +12.
5.1
Firm level results Figure 3 .A plots the daily abnormal returns and Figure 3 .B plots the cumulative abnormal returns over the period day -45 to day +45. Firms experience significant positive abnormal return of +0.49%
Panel 1 of
during the event period (defined as the actual announcement date and the two days around it).
In order to ensure independence of returns within the panel of available data, we also conduct the event study for a restricted sample. For parent firms that appear more than once during a three year period, we retain only the earliest occurrence of the firms in that three year period. The results for the panel of 431 parent firms, reported in Panel 2 of Table II , are similar. The abnormal return around the event date is +0.40%. Its significance drops, however, owing to the smaller sample size.
Our result is in the same direction but weaker in magnitude, compared with the results of earlier studies: M-N (1985) report an excess return of 0.73% for the two day window of -2 to 0, whereas K-V (1991) report an abnormal return of 0.87%. These numbers may appear small, but one must take into account the fact that these are returns over very small intervals: 0.49% over three days corresponds to an annualized return of 81%.
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Our finding of a lower magnitude of stock market reaction to joint venture announcements, compared to prior papers, may be because of two reasons. First, our sample firms are larger compared to the sample firms of the earlier studies. As we see in section 6.1 below, abnormal returns are negatively correlated with firm size.. Second, our data set is more recent (1986-93) compared to M-N's (1972-79) 11 Compared to the excess returns that greet merger announcements, the excess returns to joint venture announcements are indeed small. Asquith (1983) , for instance, reports 2-day excess returns of +6.5% for the acquired firms and +0.3% for the acquirers. Since joint ventures are akin to merger of only fractions of the parent firms, the difference between stock market reaction to joint ventures and mergers is consistent with expectations. 
Joint venture level results
In order to understand how the market values the joint venture as a whole, we aggregate the abnormal returns of both parties involved in the joint venture. For each joint venture, we derive an excess return figure by weighting the excess returns of the partners by their market value, and then calculating the arithmetic mean across all joint ventures. 12 For the 253 joint ventures in the sample, the abnormal returns
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Equally weighting the returns of both partners in the joint venture would bias the joint venture returns in favor of the returns experienced by the smaller partners. For example, if the two partners in a joint venture have market values of $100 million and $10 million, and experience excess returns of -0.1% and +1% respectively, then the market has placed an aggregate (Contd.) are reported in Panel 3 of 
Value creation through joint venture announcement
In dollar terms, the average excess return during the event period is $17.8 million. This finding is in consonance with M-N's finding of an average value gain of $4.8 million (p. 527) and K-V's finding of an average value gain of $12.6 million (p. 881).
Although the dollar abnormal returns are not significant at the aggregate level, the range of value creation is very broad. Abnormal returns over the three day event window range from negative $2.97 billion to positive $7.0 billion. The stock market views joint ventures as significant events, though not as unequivocally good or bad events. If market power consideration drives abnormal returns, we expect the coefficient β 1 to be negative and have no apriori expectation about the coefficient β 2 . If complementarity considerations drives abnormal returns, we expect β 1 to be positive and β 2 to be negative. The managerial misalignment reasoning suggests that the coefficient β 3 is negative, and the signaling argument suggests that the coefficient β 4 is positive.
In order to ensure independence of observations, we remove from the sample those firms that have appeared earlier in the sample as parents of other joint ventures three years before or less. Out of this panel of 431 firms, accounting data, from which the free cash flow metric is constructed, is available for only 213 firms. The regression analysis is restricted to these 213 firms.
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We construct a standardized squared abnormal returns statistic as in Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) to test whether the abnormal returns are significantly distributed around the mean. We find that the squared returns statistic is highly (Contd.) The 213 firms announced joint ventures in 94 industries. We construct specific industry dummies for the 9 industries in which 5 or more joint ventures were announced; all other industries are grouped together in one category. On partitioning the sample of firms into three groups based on their market capitalization -small (the smallest 25%), medium (the middle 50%) and large (the largest 25%) -we find that stock market reaction to joint venture announcement is highest for the small firms, middle sized firms earn negative abnormal returns, and large firms earn positive but small abnormal returns (Table III-C) . Overall, there is a significant negative correlation between abnormal returns and firm size.
Summary statistics
14 This result is consistent with M-N's finding that medium-sized firms earn the lowest abnormal returns. K-V also find that small firms earn the highest abnormal returns; however, they find a strictly declining relation between abnormal returns and firm size. (See Table III 14 This explains why average abnormal returns in reaction to the joint venture announcement decline as we move from firm-level analysis to joint venture level analysis. Firm level results weight all abnormal returns equally. Joint venture level results market value weight the partners' excess returns, thereby giving greater weightage to larger firms. Hence, the average abnormal return figure is lowered. Table IV reports In order to better understand the effects of "distance", the regression is also rerun using dummies for the following four categories of variables This method has two advantages over using the distance proxy measure. First, it is less prone to specification error. In particular, it considers distance to be an ordinal measure and does not cardinalize distance as DIST does. Second, it allows one to observe the categories separately to see when and if returns start to decline.
Regression analysis
The results are presented in Model 3. The intercept refers to the baseline return for firms in totally different SIC codes (0.4%). Firms with the same 4 digit SIC codes receive a significant negative return of -1.5% lower than the baseline case. Firms with the same 3 digit (but not 4 digit) SIC codes receive significant positive excess returns of 1.1% over the baseline case. The returns drop off to 0.8% for same 2 digit, and 0.6% for the same 1 digit. These results confirm the results using the distance variable. The best received joint ventures are those for which the parent firms are at an optimal distance to ensure complementarity while preventing duplication.
The results indicate that this optimal distance is similarity at the 3 digit SIC code level.
The negative returns for identical SIC codes also indicates that market power considerations are not important. The results for MKTRATIO and FCF are unchanged from before.
In order to estimate the relative explanatory power of the different drivers, we conduct a test akin to the one undertaken by Schmalensee (1985) . We run a set of regressions, taking different combinations of the three drivers -strategic, signaling, and managerial misalignment -with abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Table V summarizes the results. All three drivers contribute significantly to the regressions, suggesting that the stock market takes all three drivers into consideration in valuing a joint venture announcement. In order to estimate the relative importance of each of the drivers, we calculate the Shapley Value 15 of the incremental contribution of each driver to the explanatory power of the regression.
The strategic driver is the strongest determinant of stock market reaction; the managerial misalignment and signaling drivers each contribute about two-third as much as the strategic driver. If we control for industry, the strategic and managerial misalignment drivers are almost equally important determinants of stock market reaction, and the signaling driver contributes about half as much.
DISCUSSION
What does this paper add to the vast literature in the area of joint ventures? We show that joint ventures tend to be announced in times of deteriorating performance, when firms are underperforming the stock market and their accounting performance is declining as well. Firms entering joint ventures receive positive stock market reaction in aggregate, but there is considerable cross-sectional variation. We find support for the hypotheses that three drivers -strategic considerations, managerial misalignment, and signaling rationale -significantly influence stock market reaction.
This paper has normative implications for managers of firms looking at potential joint ventures. It suggests that whereas some kinds of joint ventures are value creating, others can be value diminishing.
Joint ventures create value if they help firms to overcome market failure in accessing complementary assets. Signaling also plays a key role in influencing the stock market reaction. Small firms are benefited by joint venturing with larger partners because, quite apart from the worth of the joint venture itself, the fact that a large company has chosen the small company as a partner raises the value of the small firm in the eyes of the stock market. On the other hand, managerial misalignment destroys value. Managers of firms with lots of free cash flow should be circumspect about entering joint ventures.
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The Shapley value is a measure used in cooperative game theory to gauge the contribution of a player to a coalition.
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Our study also challenges some conventional wisdom in the field. Some managers perceive joint ventures as value-creating options, allowing participation in the potential upside without having to invest wholly in a project. We find that the stock market reacts unfavorably to joint venture announcements by firms that have the free cash flow to undertake the projects on their own. Core competency, "stick to your knitting," and market power arguments would suggest that joint ventures among closely related parent firms should create value. Instead, we find that there is an optimal "distance" between the parent firms, to ensure that both parents bring capabilities to the table that are valuable, different, and mutually complementary.
We plan to extend our study along two dimensions. First, we plan to examine whether and how administrative considerations influence value creation. This paper hasn't considered issues of administrative fit, cultural match, alignment of management philosophies, and past experience with joint ventures. Could such differences exist because the stock market differentially values firms' ability to manage joint ventures? We plan to repeat our test after including in the set of independent variables proxies for the administrative driver. Second, the current study focuses on stock market's valuation of a joint venture at the time it is announced. It would be intriguing to study how joint venture performance measures against this ex-ante valuation. We plan to examine ex-post performance of the announced joint ventures and relate this to ex-ante stock market predictions. Months -12 and +12 receive negative abnormal returns at 1% level of significance. Months -6, -5, -2, +2, and +6 receive negative abnormal returns at 5% level of significance. Month -8 receives negative abnormal returns at 10% level of significance. The repetitions column includes all announced joint ventures for which we have abnormal returns. In the no repetitions column, for parent firms that appear more than once during a three year period, we retain only the earliest occurrence of the firms in that three year period. Figures on the arrows give the statistic at which an F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the incremental driver added in the box to which the arrowhead points does not contribute added explanatory power to the regression. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level for all the F-tests. If the analysis is conducted controlling for industry, the three drivers still contribute significantly to the regressions. The relative contributions to the explanatory power of the strategic, managerial, and signaling drivers become 38%, 41%, and 21%, respectively.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DRIVERS TO
